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ARENDT, TUSHNET, AND LOPEZ:
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGE
BEHIND ACKERMAN'S THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS
Candice Hoket
In his provocative article,' Mark Tushnet asks whether United
States v. Lopez2 signals a major constitutional shift in federal-
ism-specifically in the allocation of political and regulatory power
between State and Nation.3 Tushnet uses the Lopez problem to test
the adequacy of the political theory that Bruce Ackerman terms
"dualist democracy," delineated in Ackerman's work in progress.
Like many other reviewers,. Tushnet finds Ackerman's theory
f Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State University, John Marshall School of
Law. This article is based on my address of the same name, presented at the Symposium,
The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, Case Western Reserve School of Law
(Nov. 10411, 1995). My thanks go first to a number of the finest thinkers on federalism
issues today: Mel Durchslag, Jon Entin, Barry Friedman, Larry Kramer, Bill Marshall,
Debby Merritt, and Bob Nagel, all of whom were involved in this superb Symposium; to
Mark Tushnet for his challenge to Bruce Ackerman; and to George Taylor and James
Wilson for helpful critical commentary.
1. See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 845 (1996).
2. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded
Congress' commerce clause authority).
3. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 846.
4. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS passim (1991).
5. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theo-
ry, Bruce Ackerman and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 885 (1996); Robert
Justin Lipkin, Can American Constitutional Law Be Postmodern?, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 317
(1994); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 115 (1994); William W. Fisher III, The Defects of Dualism, 59 U. CIE. L.
REV. 955 (1992); Michael Klarman, Constitutional FactlConstitutional Fiction: A Critique
of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REv. 759 (1992);
Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918 (1992).
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wanting in crucial respects.
My response takes two tracks. First, I will argue that the
import of Ackerman's theory is better understood and evaluated
when it is considered more as a work of political philosophy and
political theory rather than as a work of law or jurisprudence.
Ackerman should be understood as participating in two distinct
conversations: The first, at the core of political philosophy, is con-
cerned with the possibility for human freedom. The second is cen-
tral to political theory, namely, what kind of governmental struc-
tures and organization will permit the realization of particular
philosophical commitments. I think Ackerman is making startlingly
original and valuable contributions in both realms. In the first part
of this commentary, I will situate Ackerman's theory most pointed-
ly as a direct response to Hannah Arendt.6
After locating Ackerman's effort within the centuries old polit-
ical philosophical debate over such questions as how best to struc-
ture a state that respects and expands human freedom, I will ex-
plicitly address the question Tushnet has posed,7 and suggest what
Lopez may signify within Ackerman's own categories. Exploring
two of the multitude of possibilities, I suggest initially that a
straight application of his categories may reveal that we are still in
what Ackerman calls the "signaling" stage,' which may blossom
into a transformation of our fundamental law, or might simply
wither into another "failed constitutional moment."' However, in a
different analysis, when the political implications of globalism, as
represented by NAFTA' ° and GATT,11 begin to have an effect
on the political objectives of ordinary people, and on the regulatory
power of our national, state, and local governments, our nation
may undergo a transformational contest after which Lopez will not
6. The Arendt work that has been clearly the most influential on Ackerman's thinking
is HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1963). My focus on Arendt does not imply that
Ackerman is responding only to Arendt, and not to, for instance, Aristotle, Montesquieu,
James Madison, or Alexander Bickel, who were also concerned with some of the same
perennial philosophical and practical questions about how to structure the state.
7. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 852.
8. See AcKERMAN, supra note 4, at 272-85.
9. See, e.g., id. at 50-56 (describing the "Reagan Revolution" as a failed constitutional
moment).
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 IL.M. 289, 605.
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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even register as a blip on the constitutional radar screen. In sum,
whatever criticisms can be leveled at the technical aspects of
Ackerman's theory, I think we will find that he provides us with a
vocabulary and a set of conceptual categories that allow us to
delve into a variety of interpretive possibilities, indicating again the
richness of the theory for political, social, and legal interpretation.
I. ARENDT AND ACKERMAN
Hannah Arendt's work," as Ackerman notes, has been far
less influential among professional philosophers, political theorists,
and legal scholars than it deserves to be."3 An array of reasons
may explain the neglect. Her writing is dense and grammatically
complex, and it is pervaded with phrases in the original Greek,
Latin, and French. She also did not locate herself within a preexist-
ing paradigm of political theory (e.g., pluralism) or even within
one discipline (e.g., philosophy), but blazed her own path that
12. Hannah Arendt published her work in both the popular and academic presses. A
brief biographical sketch may illuminate the reasons for her early commitment to the
public and not merely to the academic world. After earning her Ph.D. in philosophy at
the University of Heidelberg, where she worked under Karl Jasper's supervision, Arendt
was imprisoned in a German internment camp. Arendt escaped during a brief conflict
between the guards and then went to Paris until she immigrated to the United States in
1941. Her first American book, THE ORIGINS OF TOTAUTARIANIsM (rev. ed. 1966) (first
published 1951), was an interdisciplinary work which drew primarily from three distinct
fields of inquiry: philosophy, history, and political science. Her major books include: THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958); EICHmANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (rev. & enlarged 1964); ON REVOLUTION (1963); BETWEEN PAST AND FuruE
EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (reissue with additional text 1968) (including
essays on the conflict between truth and politics on freedom); CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC
(1972) (containing the essays Lying in Politics, Civil Disobedience, On Violence, and
Thoughts on Politics and Revolution).
In her last work, Arendt returned to her existentialist and Kantian roots by pursuing
a more purely philosophical inquiry than in her other books. I THE LIFE OF THE MIND:
THNKING (1978) and II THE LIFE OF THE MIND: WLLING (1978), were intended to be
the first two volumes of a three-volume work that also explored the faculty of judgment,
but she had barely written an opening epigraph for the Judgment inquiry when she died.
Thus, the two volumes THINKING and WILLING were published posthumously, and we lack
her sustained views as to the faculty she considered the most political. Her lectures on
judgment have been edited and published as HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S
POLITICAL PrLosoPHY (Ronald Beiner, ed., 1982).
13. Two decades after her death, Arendt's work is beginning to receive more sustained
and respectfnl attention. See, e.g., MARGARET CANovAN, HANNAH ARENDT, A REINTER-
PRETATION OF HER POLITICAL THOUGHT (1992); HANNAH ARENDT- TWENTY YEARS LAT-
ER (Larry May & Jerome Kohn, eds., 1996); DANA R. VILLA, ARENDT AND HEIDEGGER
(1996).
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combined philosophy, political theory, ancient and modem western
history, concern for contemporary politics, and common sense.
In addition to these intellectual obstacles to her work finding a
larger audience, Arendt has also suffered under a variety of attacks.
These range from the accusations that she was blaming the victim
in her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil14
(though she herself had served time in a German internment camp)
to the ad hominem fallacy currently in vogue, which suggests that
her philosophical work should be deemed untrustworthy or unwor-
thy of study because of her romantic relationship with the philoso-
pher Martin Heidegger,"5 and her post-war friendship with him
after he renounced Nazism. 16 Like Ackerman, I find Arendt's
work enormously challenging and refuse to sidestep serious con-
frontation with it because of differences regarding her friendships
or other matters.
14. In EICHMANN IN JERUsALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANAITY OF EVIL, supra note
12, Arendt evaluated the activities of Adolph Eichmann, a mid-level bureaucrat in Hitler's
Third Reich who handled certain logistical responsibilities for the transportation of Jews to
concentration camps. Arendt had been present at Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, and pub-
lished her articles in The New Yorker. She revised these articles and published them as a
book, the title of which was greatly misunderstood; many presumed that she was suggest-
ing that the activities of the Holocaust were banal. Rather, she was astounded to discover
that Eichmann apparently did not think about what he was doing, see id. at 287-88,
which led her to explore the relationship between everyday thoughtlessness and "mon-
strous" evil. See id. at 294. Arendt suggests that perhaps the worst evils are not commit-
ted by the ideologically committed, such as Hitler, but rather by the vast number of
thoughtless functionaries without whom the ideologues could not commit their crimes. The
book provoked a storm of criticism from Arendt's fellow Jewish immigrants, and caused
the severing of numerous close friendships. She responded to the criticism in a postscript
included as a portion of the revised edition, which was published in 1964. Id. at 292-98.
15. Heidegger was Arendt's first University-level mentor. He later became a prominent
Nazi and persecutor of Jewish intellectuals. See EuSABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH
ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 48-61, 69 (1982).
16. In ELZBmIrA ETINGR, HANNAH ARENDT/MARTiN HEIDEGGER (1995), the author
portrays Arendt as less worthy of serious study because of her purportedly uncritical rela-
tionship with Heidegger. Ettinger faults Arendt for being too willing to forgive Heidegger
after the fall of the Third Reich, and suggests that Arendt accorded Heidegger a respect
to which he was undeserving because of his Nazi activities. In reviewing Ettinger's book
for the New York Times Book Review, Judith Shulevitz is equally harsh in her judgments
about Arendt. See Judith Shulevitz, Arendt and Heidegger: An Affair to Forget?, N.Y.
TIMEs BOOK REv. Oct. 1, 1995, at 39. Yet, had Ettinger and her reviewer read THE
HumAN CONDmON, supra note 12, carefully, it would be apparent that Arendt had prac-
ticed what she had articulated as being an essential political ability to cultivate: forgive-
ness. See id. at 236-37 (discussing political action as inherently unpredictable and irrevers-
ible, and arguing in favor of forgiveness as a political virtue that should be cultivated and
practiced as an antidote to its inescapable aspects).
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What exactly are the Arendtian challenges that engage
Ackerman in We the People and make it an inspired work of polit-
ical theory? They are found in her study entitled On Revolution.1
7
The first relates to her claim that, unlike the Russian or French
Revolutions, the American Revolution "has remained sterile in
terms of world politics."'" She attributes its failure to influence
others elsewhere to an intellectual omission: namely, the lack of
post-revolutionary thought that condensed and distilled the revolu-
tionary tradition within a conceptual framework that could be fur-
ther elaborated on and exercised practically. 9 As a predicate to
such a claim, she obviously does not find the commonly used
concepts by which revolution, human freedom, and politics are
explained adequate either to explain the American revolution or to
identify its primary achievements and failures. Sadly, she observes,
our intellectuals have permitted the French and Russian revolutions
to dictate the terms under which the phenomenon will be under-
stood,2" terms which have also encouraged our nation and its for-
eign policy generally to greet revolutions elsewhere with suspicion
and dismay."
Very briefly, Arendt argues that revolution seeks to begin a
new political order of a special type, a republic, founded on human
freedom and citizen power Politics is the activity by which citi-
zens manifest their political freedom by participating in discussion
and action on issues that concern them.' The end or telos of any
revolution is the founding of an enduring constitution that protects
and provides the political space, and that integrates the everyday
citizen into the affairs of the republic.24
17. ARENDT, supra note 6.
18. Id. at 222. While Arendt would agree that ideas from the American Revolution
influenced the French Revolution, her concern is not with the nation-building that occurred
during the last portion of the eighteenth century. Rather, she focuses on ascertaining why
the nations born between the second World War and the time of her writing in 1965
were more influenced by the Russian and French Revolutions than by the American.
19. See i. at 222, 234-35.
20. See id. at 49, 222; see also id. at 217-59 (discussing the French Revolution); id. at
259-70 (discussing the Russian Revolution).
21. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 217-21.
22. See id. at 28, 127, 139, 140 (noting that "the end of rebellion is liberation, while
the end of revolution is the foundation of freedom').
23. See id. at 25, 115, 221.
24. See id. at 121-22, 235.
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Arendt contends that the intellectual failure to understand the
American revolution was preceded by the Founders' failure to
provide within the Constitution an institution within which the
revolutionary spirit, and the opportunity for widespread citizen
involvement in public affairs, could be safeguarded.' This claim
constitutes the second major challenge for Ackerman.26 Under
Arendt's analysis, the Founders-and here she encompasses those
involved not only in Philadelphia but also those active in the for-
mation of the Bill of Rights-had provided an institution for every
other human trait that was requisite to the functioning of the gov-
ernment; they had fashioned structures that inculcated judgment,
opinion, reason, and political power;, they protected individual
liberties and other citizen rights; they had designed a complex
system of structural checks and balances to circumscribe the threat
of tyranny; they skillfully incorporated elements of monarchic,
aristocratic, and democratic governments.27 Yet, they had by-
passed, presumably deliberately, the creation of any institution that
would reserve space "for the exercise of precisely those qualities
which had been instrumental" in building the Republic-that is,
widespread ordinary citizen political action, such as might have
been available had the townships been dignified, Arendt suggests,
with a constitutional status and set of delegated powers.29
In We the People and more recent work,30 Ackerman can be
understood to respond simultaneously to both challenges. He articu-
lates a theory of politics and of constitutional structure which,
interwoven, seeks to demonstrate that, contrary to Arendt, the
Founders did not arrogate strictly to themselves the revolutionary
spirit, nor did they fail to institutionalize The People's political
possibilities. Rather, by understanding politics on a two-track or
25. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 234, 242.
26. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 206.
27. See ARENDT, supra note 6, at 231, 234.
28. Id. at 234.
29. See id at 238-42, 242 ("Paradoxical[ly] ... it was the Constitution itself, this
greatest achievement of the American people, which eventually cheated them of their
proudest possession").
30. For one foray into explaining American constitutional history of the twentieth histo-
ry through his dualist political lens, see Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 804 (1995) (tracing the demise of compliance
with the Treaty Clause's requirements when the United States enters international agree-
ments, and positing this history further evidences the extra-textual method of constitutional
amendment ACKERMAN advanced in WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 4).
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dualist theory,3 we can more accurately perceive how The
People's political freedom has been preserved and how a republic
is possible even within a large, heterogeneous country-a dilemma
that vexed Montesquieu,3 2 Madison, 33 Jefferson,34  and even Aris-
totle.35 To admire Ackerman's theoretical achievements is not to
say that the technical features of the theory are sufficient, especial-
ly the rules of recognition for a constitutional moment. In fact,
others have clarified that they require further refinement. 36 But it
is to say that via Ackerman's work, and its building upon and
response to Arendt's, we can finally explain how and why the
Constitution is not primarily a reactionary document.37 Acker-
31. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, passim. The theory of dualist democracy contends
that The People's lawmaking occurs in two separate modes. In periods of "normal poli-
tics," average citizens are content to be governed by their representatives, and generally
are characterized by apathy and self-interest Id. at 265. In the rare times of "constitution-
al politics," The People are roused from the slumber of their normal private lives to par-
take in widespread public debate and resolution about some central public issue; their
activity is characterized by concern for the permanent interests of the community or the
rights of citizens. Id. at 240, 272-74. The latter periods may mature into "constitutional
moments," where the Constitution is effectively amended but not according to any of the
methods specified by Article V. The theory of extra-Article V constitutional amendments
has drawn particular censure, see supra note 5, despite Ackerman's claim that he is accu-
rately portraying the constitutional impact of the New Deal.
32. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 126 (Nugent trans., 1949)
(analyzing types of governments and proposing specific constitutional structures).
33. Madison's first essay, now identified as THE FEDERAUST No. 10, rejected the
theory propounded by Aristotle and Montesquieu that republics could persist in only
small, relatively homogeneous geographical areas. Madison instead articulated a theory of
the extended republic, whose diversity of interests helped to promote the republic's imper-
viousness to any one faction obtaining the control requisite to subordinate The People. See
THE REPUBLIC OF LmTERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JEFFERSON AND MADISON
1776-1826, at 448-50 (James Morton Smith, ed., 1995) (revealing the thoughts of Madison
and Jefferson regarding politics, government, and other concerns); see also STANLEY
ELKINS & ERIC McKrrIRcK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 87 (1993) (seeking to recover the
character and substance of the original structure of the nation and making sense of the
American Revolution).
34. Although Madison sent Jefferson a copy of the first of his essays penned as
"Publius," THE FEDERALIST No. 10, Jefferson did not respond to Madison's theory of the
extended Republic. In 1787, Jefferson was still committed to the ancient precept that
republics could exist effectively only in a small territory. See TEE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS,
supra note 33, at 449-50, 450 n.54.
35. See 4 ARISTOTLE, PoLTmcs (Ernest Barker trans., 1958) (discussing what types of
governmental structure are best suited for the varying size of states).
36. See McConnell, supra note 5, passim.
37. "Reactionary" in the sense of responding to the events of colonial and revolution-
ary America. By contrast, Ackerman self-consciously elaborates a theory that affirms the
constitutionally generative capacities of the American people.
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man's theory helps to clarify how we can in substance, and not
merely in form, continue to claim to be a republic despite our
nation's size and the lack of widespread, constant citizen political
action.
How exactly does Ackerman meet these challenges? In the
dualist political theory,38 the ordinary citizen is descriptively rec-
ognized as not consumed with political matters during most of her
life; she is generally a "private citizen."'39 Yet there are times and
issues that elicit rapt attention and concern from such citizens, who
otherwise generally acquiesce in representative government. In these
unusual times, however we come to define their criteria, citizens
come out of the shelters of their private lives and engage one
another much more than normally on certain fundamental political
questions, for a rather lengthy but unspecified period of time. Fur-
ther, some national institution must reject initial efforts at revising
the fundamental law so as to sharpen the debate and test The Peo-
ple's commitment to changing fundamental law.' Thus, in Acker-
man's theory, citizens are not required to adopt an entire life of
intense political activity in order to manifest their political freedom.
Nor is broad-based political activity from average citizens a pre-
condition for a government to be entitled to name itself a republic.
Instead, so long as average citizens-The People---continue to
maintain the latent power and channels by which they can emerge
and force the creation of new principles on which their government
will be structured, or of fundamental policies that their government
will effectuate, in Ackerman's theory the government remains a
republic.
Moreover, Ackerman answers Arendt that the Founders did not
neglect to institutionalize everyday citizens' political freedom. They
provided precisely the opportunities Ackerman has identified,
though they differ for normal politics versus constitutional or foun-
dation-changing politics. It is within this latter category that the
revolutionary spirit of initiating a new foundation of some type can
continue to be manifested.41 In his theory, Ackerman not only
38. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
39. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 231-59 (discussing a dualist democracy
and discovering the Constitution).
40. See id. at 285-88.
41. Although Ackerman proposes a theory by which to answer Arendt's concerns about
the American Constitution and the loss of the authentically revolutionary tradition, he
could be challenged as not providing a sufficient answer. It is not the project of this brief
[Vol. 47:903
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answers Arendt and Montesquieu, among others, but also poses
concomitantly a direct challenge to those like myself who have
argued, for a variety of reasons, in favor of maintaining meaningful
regulatory and political power at the local and state levels.42
II. THE MEANING OF LoPEz AND THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM
Now let me turn, in the second part of my response, more
directly to Lopez itself. Does Lopez demarcate a constitutional
moment? Robert Nagel and his respondents resoundingly demon-
strated the inadequacies of both that case, and of the Court more
generally, spearheading a fundamental transformation in the alloca-
tion of power between State and Nation.43 To speak in the lan-
guage of Ackerman, the Court is charged institutionally to preserve
The People's fundamental law and not with any "prophetic" role
by which it unilaterally decides where the nation's fundamental law
should be headed.'
But Lopez is the first case since the New Deal where the
Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute as beyond the interstate
commerce power where the Tenth Amendment was not in-
volved.45 Surely this means something more than Jonathan Macey
commentary, however, to evaluate the legal, political, and philosophical sufficiency of
Ackerman's theory. Instead the goal of this commentary is to contextualize his project as
primarily philosophic.
42. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values,
71 B.U. L. REv. 685 (1991) (discussing reasons for a revitalized federalism and the es-
sential factors and concerns for public participation in determining government policy).
43. See Robert F. Nagel, The Future of Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REV. 643 (1996); Jesse Choper, Did Last Term Reveal "A Revolution-
ary States' Rights' Movement Within the Supreme Court"?, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. REv.
663 (1996) (hesitating in finding such); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Will the Real Alfonso
Lopez Please Stand Up: A Reply to Professor Nagel, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 671
(1996) (arguing that the evidence that the Supreme Court is repackaging the same com-
merce clause test in Lopez is far more opaque and important than Professor Nagel sug-
gests); Deborah Jones Meritt, The Fuzzy Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
685 (1996) (focusing on the tension between the constitutional theory of a limited central
government and the reality of enumerated politics).
44. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 139:
The prophetic vision of the Court is flatly inconsistent with the principles of
dualist democracy. Even if judges could successfully gain popular acquiescence,
this kind of top-down transformation is the opposite of bottom-up transforma-
tions prized by dualist democrats. It is not the special province of the judges
to lead the People onward and upward to new and higher values.
See id.
45. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (ruling that both the Tenth
19971
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suggested, that the Court was merely blowing a whistle to remind
players that it has a role to play in determining the meaning of the
commerce power.46 But Lopez's meaning, when evaluated through
the Ackerman prism of interpretive categories, is not self-evident.
This lack of interpretive determinacy can function as a wedge for
criticizing Ackerman's theory, as Tushnet has, or we can use the
very malleability of the theory's categories to promote critical
thinking about the intersection of the law, politics, and culture of
our times along a number of disparate paths. Such an engagement
with and critical analysis of the political and legal events of our
time, and the variety of potential answers yielded thereby, need not
be construed as evidence of the theory's holes but rather of its
interpretive fruitfulness.
In the brief space that follows, I would like to explore two of
the multiple thought paths that Ackerman's theory opens for us.
One involves a more uncritical application of Ackerman's catego-
ries and analytic moves, and considers Lopez as attempting to
"spark" a constitutional moment. The other sketches the portent of
a much more challenging period that may lie in our Nation's fu-
ture.
A. Lopez as a "Sparking" Effort
Lopez can be viewed as attempting to catalyze public attention
to a particular set of lost principles, analogous to Brown v. Board
of Education.47 In Brown, the principles were drawn from the Re-
construction Amendments;48 in Lopez, from the understanding of
Amendment and the Interstate Commerce Clause had been violated by the statute at issue
there, because of their purportedly being "mirror images" of one another).
46. See Jonathan Macey, Comment at Symposium: The Future of Federalism After
United States v. Lopez, Case Western Reserve School of Law (Nov. 10-11, 1995) (video-
tape available in Case Western Reserve Law School Library). Yet Suzanna Sherry sug-
gests that the case indeed may be nothing more than an example of the Court's occasion-
al bite, in an effort to have others take its generally unenforced bark (regarding the sup-
posed limits of the commerce power) seriously. See Suzanna Sherry, The Barking Dog, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 877 (1996) (asserting that Lopez will join a list of cases that
seem to suggest major change at first but are subsequently ignored).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 141; see also Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1132 (1995) (arguing
the Brown Court erred in basing its decision ahistorically and primarily upon social sci-
ence when the decision could have been more soundly grounded if the Court had used an
originalist interpretive methodology and historical sources showing that framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended its reach to extend to segregation); Robert L. Hayman,
[Vol. 47.903
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the federal government as having limited powers--"few and defi-
nite" as Publius put it.49 In its "sparking" function, the Court's
role is not prophetic or visionary, but rather one where it seeks to
hold a mirror to The People, to invite them to consider whether
the moribund principle should be reinvigorated. This sparking ac-
tivity of the Court, to which the political branches or The People
themselves may respond, is a legitimate function within Acker-
man's theory.'
Lopez indeed sparked a political response. This included not
only a new version of the act that the Court had ruled unconstitu-
tional,"1 but arguably aspects of other legislation during the 104th
Congress.5 2 Substantial regulatory changes, for example, have now
occurred in federal welfare benefits law.53 Taking an incremental-
Jr., Re-Cognizing Inequality: Rebellion, Redemption, And the Struggle for Transcendence in
the Equal Protection of the Law, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REv. 9, 55 (1991) (exploring the
import of two ideal types of thinking concerning race and inequality, and examining their
role in Brown and other Equal Protection decisions).
49. The constitutional principle of enumerated federal powers, as Nagel demonstrates, is
one horn of the persistent constitutional dilemma of federalism. See Nagel, supra note 43,
at 649.
50. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 139.
51. In the 102nd Congress, Congress enacted a new version of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). In an attempt to redress the
Court's concern about the lack of findings regarding the relationship between interstate
commerce and the purposes of the Act, the new version codified nine separate findings
relating to the interstate movement of guns and ammunition, drugs, and criminal gangs,
and the negative effects of this activity on the quality of education. See id. at §
922(q)(1). It specifically found that "decline in the quality of education has an adverse
impact on interstate commerce .... " Id. at § 922(q)(1)(G). In its ninth finding, Congress
declared: "Congress has power, under the interstate commerce clause and other provisions
of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the Nation's
schools .. " Id. at § 922(q)(1)(1).
52. One early bill concerned with revitalizing the federal structure, the Unfunded Man-
dates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995), was a response to
the sparking activity of New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Cass Sunstein
has recently suggested that the House of Representatives of the 104th Congress pursued a
legislative program in which the role of government at every level was reevaluated, in-
cluding the most foundational commitments of the New Deal. See Cass Sunstein, Con-
gress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 250
(1996) (exploring regulatory reform efforts of the 104th Congress as evidence of the at-
tempt to reevaluate government's role at all levels). Although Sunstein contends little was
ultimately achieved in the form of enacted legislation, and most of that was "crude, un-
imaginative, and . . . procedural," he was writing before the end of the session. Id. Wel-
fare and immigration reform bills were enacted, amid commentary that they signaled the
demise of the New Deal.
53. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA or Welfare Reform Act), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (revising
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ist view of how a new constitutional regime is achieved, Lopez,
conjoined with two other cases reasserting the constitutional vitality
of federalism, New York v. United States4 and Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida," can be considered one portion of the Court's
current movement toward reconceptualizing both the scope and
structure of federal government powers.56
B. The Global Economy/Republic?
Assuming that Lopez is at most a way station or intermediate
step toward a transformation of some fundamental constitutional
relationships, let me draw back from specific discussion of that
case to accept Ackerman's broader Hegelian invitation to speculate
on where we stand in the sweep of constitutional history and to
prognosticate about what lies ahead.57 Evaluating our larger poli-
tics, culture, and international economic position, we can ask, are
we nearing the creation of a new constitutional regime? If so, with
regard to changing which fundamental legal principles and why?
As I suggested earlier, I do believe we are entering a dangerous
time, although its ultimate conclusion cannot be predicted.
We are living in a paradoxical period, the resolution of which
might become the new post-New Deal constitutional regime. In the
1990s, the competing pressures of economic globalism and a return
to what can be called political localism-the latter an outcome
Arendt would praise-have embedded within them conflicting
structural values. Economic globalism presses a nation to make
decisions more in conformity with other nations' policies and pref-
erences than with its own people's.58 A government's accountabil-
numerous aspects of the historic federal public assistance programs, including the elimina-
tion of a federal entitlement to public assistance on the basis of economic need and im-
position of strict work requirements for recipients). For a critical assessment, see Peter
Edelman, The Worst Thing Bill Clinton Has Done, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1997, at
43.
54. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating under the Tenth Amendment a federal statute
that sought to impose an expensive federal regulatory program upon the states).
55. 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding federal acts passed pursuant to the Indian Com-
merce Clause cannot abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment immunity to federal court
jurisdiction).
56. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 863.
57. At the Association of American Law Schools Workshop on Constitutional Law,
held in June 1993, Ackerman characterized himself as a "weak Hegelian." Some might
find this an understatement.
58. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1441, 1479 (1994) (stating that incentives toward a global economy undermine local corn-
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ity to its people is weakened, thereby resulting in a less effective
representative republic. 9 The manner by which these values are
harmonized, or the conflict transcended, may provide the new
constitutional norms requisite to the creation of a new constitution-
al regime.
Intense political pressures have recently arisen to restore the
power and dignity of local and state governments, yet at the same
time Congress has approved the most far-reaching international
economic accords. Under these new international agreements, spe-
cifically the Uruguay Round Agreements of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, other nations are permitted to challenge
aspects of our domestic law that they consider inconsistent with the
Agreement.' Barry Friedman has explored the potential impact of
the Uruguay Round on the laws of our states, observing that
GATT seeks to harmonize into a unitary international regulatory
law significant aspects of state legislative power.6! He concludes
by noting that "the process of harmonization suggests an even
smaller, not greater, role for the states.' ' 62
State and local governments provide the mechanism by which
citizens participate most directly in developing governmental policy.
As now, when citizen antipathy toward the federal government is
high, these subnational governments provide an alternative focus
for citizens' political efforts and hopes. We can identify some of
the public concerns triggering this antipathy and the consequent
refocus on less remote governmental units. In the past two decades,
there has been growing sentiment that the federal government is
characterized by overweening arrogance and concomitant conde-
scension toward its average citizenry.63 It is also criticized for its
munities interests in favor of international ones).
59. Consider Justice O'Connor's parallel concerns about attenuated governmental ac-
countability resulting from unfunded federal mandates. See New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992) (stating that decreased accountability to the electorate results
when states are compelled to enact regulations promulgated by the federal government).
60. One example of this is the final Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. See Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994 MTN/FA (1994) [hereinafter 1994 GATE Final Act]. The portion of the
federal legislation authorizing United States participation in the dispute panel process is
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994).
61. Friedman, supra note 58, at 1447-59.
62. Id. at 1459.
63. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 249 (referring to "widespread popular dissatisfaction
with government"); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62
TENN. L. REV. 443 (1995) (examining the concerns of the politically disaffected within
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extraordinary waste of resources and remoteness from peo-
ple-except when ordering them to do or to refrain from doing
something. It is assailed for the degree of control it exerts over
everyday life of citizens and businesses, and for the perceived
impotence of many citizens to effect meaningful change of its
policies. These are the perceptions that Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich and his followers were able to tap into to foment their
party's resurgence, and especially its majority control of Congress,
for the first time in several decades. But these sentiments were
tapped opportunistically, as the failure of federal campaign finance
reform illustrates.'
The various reform efforts sought at the national level may
pale once the citizenry begins to understand the impact of the new
trade agreements on their various governments, and more precisely,
on their own political power. In his article, Mark Tushnet writes of
public power's disappearance because of its "evaporation."'65 When
considering GATT, the federal government should rather be viewed
as having effectively transferred or, better, surrendered, potentially
vast amounts of regulatory power formerly held at federal, state,
and local levels to the international commercial arbitration pan-
els.' Once the new arbitration systems are fully operational, they
have the effective capacity to constrict the amount and finality of
power traditionally vested and potentially exercised by our govern-
ments, even though the federal legislation mandating U.S. participa-
tion ostensibly attempts to protect against such an outcome.67 The
the United States, including those in the militia groups).
64. See Adam Clymer, Many Proposals, Few Supporters, on Campaign Law, N.Y.
TImS, Apr. 6, 1997, at 1; Eric Schmitt, Senate Rejects Amendment on Financing of Cam-
paigns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at A14.
65. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 869 (arguing that the decrease in the power of the
federal government has not resulted in a corresponding increase of power at the state and
local level).
66. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994) (mandating United States participation in the dispute
panel process for conflict resolution).
67. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act's, 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994), approach to the
survival of State law merits some attention. A State is given the right to consult and
advise the trade representative when one of its laws is challenged, § 3512(b), and the
legislation explicitly forecloses the ability of an international arbitration panel to invalidate
a challenged State law. § 3512(b)(2)(A). Rather, that power is vested exclusively in the
United States § 3512(c). No private party or other nation may challenge the State's law
(or that of its political subdivision) on the basis that it violates the most recent phase
constituting the GATT agreement, known as the Uruguay Round Agreements. The legisla-
tion additionally seeks to protect State policy making by expressly stating that even where
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Uruguay Round agreements may reduce our governments' effective
power to the point that they may simply "float" various regulatory
measures-be they for food and drug safety, environmental protec-
tion, or other public-regarding ends-for international commercial
approval.' While the ultimate legal validity of this domestic leg-
islation resides in our own courts, the United States has agreed to
take reasonable measures "to ensure observance of GATT by re-
gional and local governments." 69 Especially in light of the interna-
tional objective of seeking a unitary international regulatory stan-
dard, it is hard to conceive how the regulatory discretion of our
state and local governments will not be vastly constricted, and their
traditional role as laboratories of policy innovation greatly im-
paired.
The raw facts of this bargain-the trade of central features of
self-government for greater economic power in the international
economy-were not presented to The People for their debate and
approval. Rather, for the most part, they were discretely side-
stepped. 0 But the deal among economic and political elites, by
the United States files a legal challenge to the State law on the basis of its inconsistency
with the Uruguay Agreements, no deference is to be accorded any decision of a trade
panel, and the United States must shoulder the burden of proof as to State law inconsis-
tency. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3512(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (1994). Whether the legislation is an effective
framework for protecting both political self-determination and realizing an international
economic regime awaits implementation of the scheme. The involvement of States could
become merely pro forma, with State law routinely invalidated because of purportedly
national economic interests. If prior federal preemption decisions are any guide, it would
be folly to assume that the States' role as generative lawmakers would receive sustained
judicial protection. See generally Hoke, supra note 67.
68. For adjudicating Technical Barriers to Trade, which are mandatory provisions gov-
erning products, their production process, and their packaging, the standards that GATT
explicitly incorporates are existing international standards. If a government wants to exceed
that standard, or to impose a standard where one has not previously existed, the govern-
ment must shoulder a high burden of proof. See 1994 GATT Final Act, MTN/FA, II-
A1A-6, Art. 2.4 (embodying the requirement that where international standards exist dictat-
ing technical regulations, they must be used unless it can be shown they are ineffective
or constitute inappropriate means of achieving GATT objectives); see also Katherine
Tammaro, Why States Should Worry about GAT, in CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATVES,
POLICY ALTERNATIVES ON THE ENVIRONMENT. A STATE REPORT 7-9 (Aug. 1992); Daniel
A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATTs-Eye View
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1421-31, 1433-34 (1994)
(discussing the impact of the global trade agreement on federalism principles embedded in
the Dormant Commerce Clause).
69. Tammaro, supra note 68, at 13.
70. Larry Kramer has suggested that The People are generally not involved in molding
and approving the transformative principles underlying a new constitutional regime. See
Kramer, supra note 5, at 893-94. Rather, they perceive themselves as problem-solving in a
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which they may have gained significantly more political and eco-
nomic power over We the People, will not remain secret forever.
At some point, perhaps after several arbitration decisions adverse to
American regulatory law,7" the deal and its effects upon their po-
litical power will become clear in terms The People can under-
stand. Then our nation will undeniably face a series of critical
questions, politically and constitutionally.
The globalization movement poses a range of questions, but I
focus on only one set here, those that would raise concerns for
Arendt. Have these agreements fashioned a system by which state
and local governments-indeed also our federal government-will
be transformed into mere shadows of self-government? More pre-
cisely, when the Uruguay Round Agreements are fully operational
and widely utilized, will our state and local governments persist as
effective government units? Will a different version of the
nondelegation doctrine surface? Will globalization kindle a return
to some form of enclave federalism, where not only certain state,
but national, powers will be listed that are constitutionally immu-
nized from international commercial arbitration? To use
Ackermanian nomenclature, these agreements are going to force not
only a period of constitutional politics, but also of difficult
intergenerational constitutional synthesis.72 And it will be not only
these agreements but The People's response to them that may gen-
erate the constitutional crisis. I fear that the conditions are rife for
the worst sort of demagoguery, and potentially fascistic appeals. In
my own writings I have argued that to preserve a republican polity
we must protect against federal encroachment spaces at the local
and state level in which The People can effectively engage in
political participation and debate.73 How much more necessary are
these spaces when the voices of The People are challenged by
particular controversy. See also ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 96-98 (citing as an example
of this proposition that the rebellion against slavery began with grassroots activities and
was not initially a judicially or legislatively developed notion).
71. The United States has lost its final appeal in its first major case pursuant to the
dispute resolution apparatus created as part of the Uruguay Rounds. In this case, regula-
tions the Environmental Protection Agency issued under the Clean Air Act were found to
have discriminated against foreign oil refiners. See David E. Sanger, U.S. Defeated in
Trade Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 30, 1996, at Dl.
72. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 86-104 (discussing the Supreme Court's role to
forge a synthesis between the divergent principles underlying the constitutional regimes).
73. See Hoke, supra note 42, passim.
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international forces such as GATT and NAFrA. If triangular syn-
thesis was a problem-that of interweaving the Founding, Recon-
struction, and New Deal understandings of the Constitution-just
wait for cubular synthesis, which requires the addition of GAT?-
style globalism. My hope is that our next constitutional moment
will be adequate to this extremely large challenge. Under this anal-
ysis, Lopez recedes into insignificance rather than forming the basis
of a new constitutional moment.

